Nationalism & Religion: The Case of Hamas

Born in inequality and contrived in sin, the spirit of nationalism has never ceased to bend human institutions to the service of dissention and distress. – Thorstein Veblen.

The horrific suicide bombing of January 14, 2004 in which twenty-two year old Reem al-Reyashi, a mother of two, blew herself up killing four Israeli soldiers at a Gaza checkpoint is certainly a watershed in the trajectory of Hamas perpetrated violence.[1] Indeed the attack, which was the first instance of istish-hadiyat (female martyrdom) for Hamas has left many questions to be asked. What motivated Reyashi and others like her to ‘sacrifice’ their lives? Is the violence purely religious? Is there an element of nationalism involved? Were the perpetrators victims or aggressors? This paper will explore the relationship between nationalism and religion with particular reference to Hamas’s role in the first and second intifada, as it attempts to answer these questions. It will thus examine the organisation’s rationale for existence and its ideological perspective, which clearly provides a solid foundation from which to motivate Palestinians like Reyashi towards istish-hadiyat.

Hamas: A Historical Overview

Founded in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yasin of the Gaza wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya or "Islamic Resistance Movement") is rooted in contemporary Islamist ideological tradition and aims to obliterate the State of Israel. Hamas was born from the first intifada. The rationale for its existence can only be explained in terms of its parent organisation the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, founded by Islamic intellectual Hassan al-Banna. The Brotherhood’s links with Palestine can be traced back to 1935, when al-Banna sent his brother Abd al-Rahman al-Banna there to establish contacts. A prominent Palestinian nationalist leader Al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini was named a local leader of the organisation. Branches had membership ranging from 12,000 to 25,000 and were attached to the command of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo.[2]

The position taken by the Brotherhood against Israel however was perceived as weak by a section of its members and in 1948, a break-away faction established themselves as Islamic Jihad. The first intifada (1987) caused further dissention within the Brotherhood, especially among its younger members. The dispute centred once again on the Brotherhood’s inactive position vis-à-vis Palestine. An ideological clash emerged – the official position adopted by the Brotherhood was that there first needed to be ‘an Islamic transformation of society, which it saw as the prerequisite for Palestine.’[3] Islamic Jihad however took the position that an armed struggle was the only solution to the Palestinian problem and that Muslims should not wait for the Islamisation of society.[4] Hamas emerged from within this polemical setting as an outlet for the Brotherhood, with which to appease its more radical members. The emergence of the new organisation was thus as an alternative to the Fatah-led Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) of Yasser Arafat. While both shared the goal of liberating Palestine, the former was opposed to the secularist stance of the latter. As Abu-Amr commented, “all Islamic groups, not only in Palestine but throughout the Muslim world consider Palestine in its entirety as Muslim land, no part of which can be ceded under any circumstances.”[5] The establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is therefore seen as sinful if it entails conceding any part of the rest of the territory to Israel, an illegitimate entity.[6]

Much like Lebanon’s Hizbullah, Hamas has both a military and political wing. The military wing - Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades - is named after the inspirational Islamist leader ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam who was killed by the British in 1935. Hamas’s landslide victory at the January 2006 parliamentary elections brought the party into power at a time when few expected it. It is led within the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) by Prime Minister Ismail Haniya.

An Ideological Perspective

The programme of Hamas is described in its Charter to be Islam and is advocated as an all encompassing way of life.[7] Significantly, it also proclaims itself to be a universal organisation.[8] Hamas welcomes “every Muslim who embraces its faith, ideology, follows its programmes, keeps its secrets and wants to belong to its ranks and carry out its duty,” adding in its charter that “Allah will certainly reward such one (sic).”[9] The use of language weighted towards religion, directly in the name of God, frames aggression in the name of Islam, thus justifying it in the eyes of the perpetrators to be.

Terrorism in the name of God is not unique to Hamas or for that matter, to Islam. Indeed Christian Identity leader Kerry Noble professed “The Lord God is a man of War,” regretfully admitting later that his group “needed to know that it was time to cross the line into violence” and that these actions would be “acceptable to the Lord.”[10] Juergensmeyer referred to the use of such religious symbolism as in pursuit of a ‘cosmic war,’ dichotomising ‘metaphysical conflicts between good and evil.’[11] Indeed it is precisely those terms that were used by Sheikh Yassin in describing the Palestinian-Jewish conflict.[12] Undoubtedly it is this religious symbolism that has proved so effective for Hamas in mobilising the Palestinian populace. The effectiveness of religion as a mobilising tool towards violence is amply evidenced in the following comment by an Islamist terrorist:

You have to understand that armed attacks are an integral part of the organisation’s struggle against the Zionist occupier. There is no other way to redeem the land of Palestine and expel the occupier. Our goals can only be achieved through force, but force is the means, not the end. History shows that without force it will be impossible to achieve independence. Those who carry out the attacks are doing Allah’s work…[13]

The rise of Hamas twenty years after the emergence of Fatah highlighted a crucial development in the trajectory of the Jewish-Arab conflict. While Fatah filled in where the Movement for Arab Nationalists (MAN) had failed, Hamas emerged from the first intifada, contending for power with the former. Thus the birth of Hamas could be viewed as having been seen as necessary due to a perceived failure of Fatah’s tactics vis-à-vis the liberation of Palestine. Whereas nationalism espoused by the MAN was distinctly of a pan-Arabic nature, Fatah waged its liberation campaign based on secular nationalism.[14] Thus Hamas’s proclamation that “Islam is the solution and the alternative” could be viewed as an outright rejection of the secular tactics of the PLO.[15]

The Rise of Political Islam on the International Stage

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is widely believed to have been the catalyst in the re-emergence of political Islam on the international stage. It could perhaps be argued that the disintegration of the Soviet Union a decade later saw Islamism replace communism as the dominant ‘other’ on the ideological spectrum of international politics. It was against this backdrop that Hamas emerged from the first intifada of December 1987.

Lewis pointed out that political Islam cannot be categorised as being purely left-wing or right-wing, liberal or conservative. He argued that it is an ideology in itself.[16] Butko meanwhile, taking a Gramscian approach, argued that political Islam can be utilised as a cohesive ideology in unifying an organisation for a long-term strategy of a mobilised uprising against an authoritarian state.[17] He argued that this framework can be applied to the works of principle modern Islamic theorists of the twentieth century such as al-Banna, Qutb, Mawdudi and Khomeini.[18] That Hamas was heavily influenced by the work of both al-Banna and Qutb, albeit the cosmic influence of Khomeini is indeed noteworthy in any assessment of the movement and its objectives.

The Role of Nationalism and Identity

Hamas’s ideology is rooted in both a primordialist and a culturalist depiction of history in the argument that Palestine was historically and traditionally the land of the Muslims.[19] In its Charter, the movement refers to the time of the Crusaders and the defeat of Salah el-Din. Mentioned in the same light is the need to cleanse school curricula of the “ideological invasion” of the “orientalists and the missionaries.”[20] Its strategies however, could be described as being both modernist and instrumentalist. Modernism is evidenced in its charter declaration that stresses the importance of being acquainted with current events, commentary and analysis, parallel to an education of Islamist culture and values.[21] Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi meanwhile echoed instrumentalism when he remarked that “Palestine has been occupied for two hundred years and then liberated.” He said “this time we have been occupied for only fifty years. We have to wait.”[22] The strategy is a war of attrition.

Sprinzak theorised that “extensional delegitimation” is “an extension of a deeply rooted sense of bitterness and historical opposition, a terrorism launched in the name of national liberation or a simple quest for freedom.”[23] Indeed the primordialist school of thought takes root in this respect, in the period of disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Hamas Charter alleges that “they were able to destroy the Islamic Caliphate” and “obtained (sic) the Balfour Declaration.”[24] As declared by Hamas, the Zionist plan extends to the time of its documentation in the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion.’ Of more recent significance in the Islamisation of the conflict meanwhile is perhaps the 1935 fatwa by the Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husayni that described Palestine as “a trust (amana) entrusted by God and all the Muslims to the Muslims of Palestine.”[25] Hamas documents the cause of the conflict as the absence of Islam in their daily lives. To quote its Charter, “when Islam is absent from the arena, everything changes.”[26] Indeed this corresponds with the thinking of al-Banna, who described Zionism as “a beneficial experience (manha), which exposes the decadence of the Islamic world and offers it a chance of self-purification.”[27] Hamas’s framing of the Palestinian issue in the historical context offers legitimacy to their struggle through the public perception of a ‘deeply rooted sense of bitterness.’ Its emphasis that Palestine was declared an Islamic waqf and that the Muslims were ‘usurped’ from their ‘homeland’ appeals to a sense of identity of the Muslims.

The numerous mentioning of the term ‘homeland’ in the Hamas Charter is indicative of the obvious territorial claim, thus reverting once again to a primordialist, culturalist depiction of history in terms of the Palestinian people. The perception of the Jews is therefore one of an in-group perceiving an out-group.[28] Indeed the antipathy towards foreign dominance is evident. Religion is used as an all-encompassing way of life not only with which to mobilise the populace but also to reform society and to purge it of its colonialist ideological, social and cultural influences.

Ahmad argued that political Islam is not nationalistic in character, but rather is ideological. He argued that the Islamic revival and reconstruction (tajdid) is of international reach and has been brought on by both a response to colonialism and an erosion of Islamic culture and values at the expense of western influences.[29] The international system should thus be viewed, not within the parochial context of national borders but within the larger concept of the ummah (Muslim community).[30] An understanding of tajdid is thus vital in order to comprehend the motivations behind Hamas’s struggle.

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the materialisation of the Balfour Declaration were both consequences of western imperialism. The suit, the buttoned shirt and tie are all influences from the west, as are the mini-skirt, tank-top, Hollywood movies and their culture, rap and pop music. Indeed such influences have given rise to a new popular culture, which Islamists would argue, have replaced traditional Islamic values and a lifestyle that should necessarily be styled on the Qur’an and the Sunna. It is often for the preservation of such values that they advocate a legal system based on the sha’ria, as opposed to secularism and civil law. Nevertheless as Hamas has acknowledged, the need to embrace the best of modernism has been widely recognised.[31] Malaysia under Mahathir embraced such a modernisation programme based on Islam.[32] The emergence of modernist Islamist movements such as al-Qaida on a global scale thus share a similar rationale, albeit distinctly different methodologies. Significantly, Islamist thinking is non-sectarian as Ahmad pointed out: the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood published works of Shia scholars such as Sadr, Khomeini and Shariati, while the works of Sunni thinkers Mawdudi, Qutb and al-Banna have been published by the Shia communities of Qum.[33]

Evidently, Islamism as an ideology is closely inter-connected with identity. In the case of the global Salafi movement, that identity corresponds closely with the ummah. In the case of Hamas meanwhile, identity albeit its Islamist dimensions, also adopts a very nationalistic approach. Zionist imperialism in the Occupied Territories has subjugated millions of Palestinians to Israel’s dictates. The territorial boundaries of present day Israel stand in violation of the 1967 borders, which consequently violates international law through contravention of Security Council Resolution 242.[34] Thus, the territories extending from the West Bank to Haifa, Netanya, Tel Aviv, Ashdod and Be’er Sheva as well as from the present day north-eastern border of the Gaza Strip to the town of Ashkelon remain an occupied zone. The negative influences of imperialism have thus heavily impacted those now resident in the West Bank and Gaza, as it has the Palestinians living within the ranked system of ethnic stratification of the Occupied Territories.[35]

Hamas upholds the belief that if Islam reigns supreme, “organisations hostile to humanity and Islam will be obliterated.”[36] It is significant that it denotes Israel as an ‘organisation hostile to humanity and Islam.’ While there are only passing mentions of the sha’ria in terms of future governance of an Islamic state, adherence to an Islamic system of justice is mentioned in article two.[37] Indeed as Litvak observed, the dichotomy between the Palestinians and the Jews has through Hamas, transcended into an unbridgeable dichotomy between two absolutes – Islam and Judaism.[38] Needless to say, there is little doubt as to its Islamist intentions. As Litvak argued, while the rival Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) claimed to differentiate between the Zionists and the Jews, Hamas perceives them both in monolithic terms.[39] This claim has however, been disputed by Hroub, who argued that it is not an anti-Jewish jihad that Hamas is waging but one against an infidel (kafir) occupier of land that Hamas determines to be an Islamic waqf (trust).[40] Nevertheless, the movement’s Charter proclaims that secret societies such as “the Freemasons, the Rotary, the Lions Clubs and other sabotage groups” are being set up for the purposes of Jewish espionage in a bid to control the world.[41] It further alleges that the United Nations Security Council was formed to replace the League of Nations, so as to give the Jews a further opportunity to utilise their money in a quest for global control.[42]

An interesting comparison meanwhile maybe drawn between Lebanon’s Hizbullah and Hamas in that both organisations have the stated objective of obliterating the ‘Zionist occupier.’ Each draws popular support from Islam, legitimising the struggle or the armed jihad against the enemy, in terms of a struggle in the name of Allah. Both parties are resistance organisations that also operate in the political mainstream. Thus, like Hizbullah, Hamas is dependent on popular support for both the continued resistance to Israel as well as for its metaphysical existence in the realms of political power.

In the examination of its nationalist inclinations however, the role of patriotism must also be explored. Barber suggested that patriotism extends to an individual’s most immediate environment, a sense of identification with a ‘very large group of individuals that perceives itself as a nation or a people.’[43] Taylor meanwhile considered ‘belonging’ to be ‘an essential component inherent in the foundation for creating a sense of patriotism in the socio-political context.’[44] The views of these two thinkers are reflected in Hamas’s emphasis on the need for Muslims to rise to the Zionist enemy to defend Palestine, which it upholds, has historically been a holy land exclusively for the Muslims.[45] The al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem lends heavily to this significance. Indeed as previously mentioned, Hamas maintains that “Palestine is an Islamic waqf consecrated for future Muslim generations until Judgement Day.”[46]

As Munson pointed out, Islamists generally condemn nationalism (qawmiyya) but yet they are often remarkably nationalistic.[47] Khomeini’s criticism of the Iranian parliament where the Ayatollah condemned the passing of a bill granting diplomatic immunity to American military and civilian personnel is a good example. In the account related by Munson, Khomeini likens everyday Iranians and the Shah alike to dogs, in comparison with the Americans, saying that if someone runs over an American’s dog, he will be liable for investigation and prosecution, whereas if an American cook runs over the Shah himself, no one can prosecute him. Khomeini declared that the Shah has “sold the independence of Iran and its dignity to reduce it to the level of the enslaved and most backward nations.”[48] It is thus evident how such populist rhetoric is used in tandem with a movement supposedly as spiritual as the consecration of jihad. Indeed as Litvak commented, “the religious idiom has always played an important role in the evolution of Palestinian nationalism and in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”[49]

Mass Mobilisation and Grassroots Politics

The election triumph of Hamas at the January 2006 parliamentary polls was not just unexpected but was also unwelcome both by Israel and much of the west. The New Republic vehemently insisted that “the results of free and fair elections can also be opposed.”[50] It remains however that Hamas’s assent to power in the PNA was a direct result of a franchise exercised by the Palestinian electors. It is thus prudent to fathom the tactics adopted that propelled Hamas to the zenith of power in the assembly.

In taking after the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas maintained an impressive network of charitable organisations, health and social services. It receives much of its funding from all parts of the Muslim world but especially from inside Palestine in the form of zakat (the Muslim tax).[51] Much like Hizbullah, its social service has stood Hamas in good stead and bolstered its support at grassroots level. As Baumgarten argued, this financial assistance could possibly have contributed to a system of accountability in which Hamas also remained more closely connected to the people and avoided being alienated from its base of mass support, something that had proven to be the bane of other groups before it.[52] The fact that most of its leaders were of lower-middle class origins and had climbed the social ladder by virtue of university or college education and professional status further differentiated it from Fatah, whose leaders were mostly middle-class townsmen. Indeed this very fact perhaps endeared Hamas to the mass populace. Most of its recruitment was carried out in the refugee camps themselves, one of the residents of which remarked that “to die for (the) fatherland is better and more honourable” than to exist under the humiliating conditions or to “receive charity as the cost of (their) honour.”[53]

Undoubtedly the failure of the Oslo Accords further contributed to Hamas’s emergence as a possible alternative to the secularist Fatah. The top-heavy nature of the latter’s decision-making process and Arafat’s own clandestine nature - or lack of transparency -vis-à-vis Oslo provided the corruption-free Islamist party with the opportunity that it sought.[54]

Pan Arabism

Hamas claims that the “liberation of Palestine is bound to three circles, the Palestinian circle, the Arab circle and the Islamic circle.”[55] It uses this reasoning to claim that “the liberation of Palestine is the duty of every Muslim, wherever he maybe.”[56] It calls on other Arab nations to consolidate efforts with their Muslim brethren in Palestine so the ‘enemy of Islam’ maybe defeated.[57] In setting the conflict within an Islamic setting, expansionism to pan-Arabism seems a natural phenomenon. Thus once again, those who do not corporate with Hamas’s wishes are labelled accomplices of the west, as Egypt was suspect to, after the Camp David Agreement.[58] The movement thus invites funding and other assistance in the name of Islam, thereby notably broadening the turf of the conflict onto the Arabian arena.[59] It is at such a point that the Palestinian nationalist movement converges with the wider ideology of political Islam and through this emerging tajdid, with the global Salafi movement to create a pan-Arabian identity of the ummah.

Rationalising Suicide Terrorism

Kruglanski and Fishman argued that suicide terrorism was used as a ‘tool,’ much in the same way that an armed group would use a rocket launcher, tank or AK-47 assault rifle.[60] Thus the motive behind the use of suicide terrorism is purely strategic in that it is an inexpensive substitute to artillery and also that the advantage of unsuspecting infiltration that the tactic offers significantly raises the probability of operational success. Such a rationale then explains the raison d’etre behind Reyashi’s actions. However, it maybe pondered as to what motivated the young mother to end her life in such a violent and grotesque manner. The following emphatic clarification on suicide terrorism by another Islamist terrorist perhaps sheds more light on this question: This is not suicide. Suicide is selfish, it is weak, it is mentally disturbed. This is istishad (martyrdom or self-sacrifice in the service of Allah).[61]

Several Islamist terrorist commanders interviewed by Post and colleagues opined that “a martyrdom operation was the highest level of jihad.” Significantly, they saw themselves not as murderers but as those who kill as part of a people’s struggle “because life has to go on.” They saw murderers to be those with psychological problems and framed their own actions not as acts stemming from a thirst for blood but as mere necessities of combat.[62]

Pedahzur referred to a ‘death culture’ in his model for describing and explaining suicide terrorism.[63] In considering the comments of the Islamist terrorists, it is apparent that they have been inculcated with such a culture of death, imbibed into their psyche as part of an existential reality.

The rationale for istishad must thus be further explored. A re-visitation of the Hamas Charter reveals the emphasis placed on the “nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement,” which it states, “is a part of religion.”[64] The Charter states that the objective of its jihad is “for the sake of hoisting the banner of Allah over their homeland.”[65]

Della Porta proposed a framework that links the life histories of individuals to political and social environments. She also noted the persistent commitment of individuals to a subversive group, a commitment which is underlined by intense identification with the group.[66] In the case of Hamas, the delegitimation of the Palestinian polity under Zionist imperialism, both in its primordialist-culturalist and modernist depictions, could well have contributed to this positive group identification. Cialdini and colleagues argued that ‘when a group is successful, those identifying with it will become more eager to display their identification with the group and thereby enhance their own status by association.’[67] The following comments by an incarcerated Islamist terrorist provide testimony to this observation:

Perpetrators of armed attacks were seen as heroes………….. Recruits were treated with great respect, a youngster who belonged to Hamas or Fatah was regarded more highly than one who didn’t belong to a group and got better treatment than unaffiliated kids…………… Anyone who didn’t enlist during that period (intifada) would have been ostracised.[68]

Ethnicity, Religion and Group Association

Brubaker argued that ethnicity as defined by some scholars as internally bound homogenous entities does not exist. He said identity cannot be naturally possessed by merely being acquired through group association. It is thus a perception or a chosen sense of group identification through such association.[69] Brubaker’s assertions could perhaps explain group association in the case of Hamas operatives. Their identity is both a Muslim one as well as an exclusively Palestinian construct. The latter contributes to its nationalism in that the Palestinian conflict is primarily territorial, over the concept of the ‘homeland.’ It is the former meanwhile that contributes to its religious dimensions and gives Hamas leverage to use Wahabbi rhetoric in framing the jihad within the wider context of the global Salafi movement. Pape’s assessment of more than 300 suicide attacks since the 1980s determined that in over 95 percent of the cases, the attackers were ‘nationalistic insurgents with a secular goal of getting the military forces out of land they believe to be theirs.’[70] Thus, the attachment to the homeland could perhaps be viewed as the foremost instrumental factor in Hamas operatives’ perpetration of istishad. Hobsbawm’s observation that ‘nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round,’ perhaps captures the reality of this group thinking.[71] James argued that the ‘proliferation of fissiparous nationalist movements based on seemingly primordial attachments’ were threatening the unity of established nation-states in the western world.[72] Such an analysis could well explain the threat to regional security brought on by both Zionist imperialism and the counter-force of the Islamist jihad that has long destabilised the Middle East.

To re-visit an argument presented in the body of this paper, Islamism as an emergent ideology could well be determined as the alternative to neo-liberalism and communism. As Ozkirimli argued, Marxism was ill prepared to cope with the proliferation of nationalism, which was seen as an emergent force in the era of colonialism and the resultant thrust towards the decolonisation of Asia and Latin America.[73] The effects of imperialism in the Arab world include the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the Balfour Declaration and Zionist imperialism. In such a context, the emergence of Islamism as a dominant ideology in parts of the Arab world could perhaps be viewed within a Gramscian framework as the only credible alternative to counter Zionism and subjugation of the lands within the Occupied Territories.

In such a light, it is prudent to examine the psyche of Hamas that resulted in their actions in the first and second intifada. While it is within reason to label Hamas as a terrorist group for its repeated suicide attacks on Israeli civilians, it remains necessary to question the rationale for its thinking.

A Psychological Analysis

Silke deplored a tendency for a ‘diagnosis at a distance’ that views terrorists to be motivated by personality disorders such as narcissism and paranoia.[74] Kruglanski and Fishman meanwhile argued against a psychological construct that defines terrorism as a syndrome. They defined ‘syndrome’ as “a concept of terrorism as a monolithic entity, a meaningful psychological construct with identifiable properties.”[75] It is also pertinent to note the study of an allied psychologist who examined the Rorschach scores of 16 captured Nazi leaders including the scores of Hermann Goering and Rudolf Huss. The study concluded that the scores of all examined individuals indicated that they were “hostile, violent and concerned with death, that they needed status and that they lacked any real human feeling.”[76] When the same scores were inserted into a mix of scores obtained from normal subjects and examined by a panel of experts however, the scores of the Nazi leaders were indistinguishable from those of the rest.[77]

Sprinzak argued that certain groups are organised around the belief that the enemy is illegitimate and thus not human. Violence and terrorism result when a group feel threatened.[78] Such a line of reason provides the underlying rationale for Hamas’s struggle. Thus as previous argued, they are rational actors who have waged a calculated war of attrition. As has been mentioned, the failure of the Oslo Accords could well have been read by Hamas as a message that called for a new form of struggle in order to realise its dream of Palestine’s liberation. The failure of the international community to arbitrate towards any meaningful solution even within the two-state model that also satisfies the aspirations of the destitute Palestinian people resulted in an outright rejection by Hamas of all forms of international conferences for peace.[79] In fact its labelling of the non-Muslim international community as ‘infidels’ maybe interpreted as a loss of confidence in their ability to arbitrate impartially. It would thus not be wayward to conclude that such a school of thought was confounded by the role of Britain in the Balfour Declaration and that of the United States in the continued support – material and otherwise – to Israel. In the case of the latter, such support has been forthcoming despite Tel Aviv’s continued violation of Security Council Resolution 242.

There is little doubt that the death of Fatah’s Yasser Arafat and his replacement by Mahmood Abbas brought about a new era in Palestinian politics. Hamas’s assent to power in January 2006 revolutionised events further. However the predicament of the two squabbling factions following a botched attempt at a national unity government remains dire, as long as Hamas remains in power and is sanctioned by the west. In fact western sanctions were the cause of armed confrontation between the two groups, after Hamas failed to pay its employees, most of whom were Fatah members, due to fiscal shortage from an aid embargo imposed by Israel, the United States and the European Union.[80] The sanctions were imposed for the refusal of the former to “recognise Israel, give up Israeli attacks and respect a peace deal with the Jewish state.”[81]

Conclusion

The question thus remains as to whether Hamas’s entrance into the political mainstream would have any moderating effect on the party. Indeed one thing remains certain: being dependent on zakat and the popular vote, the party must maintain mass support in order to continue its viability. Notably the period since Hamas’s election triumph in January to present (October, 2006) has the least recorded incidents of perpetrated violence, in comparison to the same period since at least 2000.[82] This reduction may well be a sign of such a moderating effect in a show of political realism. Indeed spokesman Mahmud Zahar noted that Hamas always calculates “the benefit and cost of continued armed operations” and affirmed that if they cannot fulfil their goals without violence, they will do so. According to Zahar, “violence is a means, not a goal.”[83]

As argued in this work, the shift towards delegitimation of the Palestinian people is evident. As has been evidenced by three nationalist movements in the form of the MAN, Fatah and Hamas, the depth of the liberation struggle is notable. The question then is not whether or not the Palestinian people want the release of the Occupied Territories but the means through which this will be achieved. Hamas has pivoted on the ‘victim’ status of the Palestinian people and transformed this perception into the role of ‘aggressors.’ It is arguably this shift in position that has alienated it from the international arena, even as retribution for its Islamist position as opposed to the secularist Fatah. What Hamas offered the Palestinian people however, was a new approach to their freedom, through a new form of life – Islam. Thus was its Islamisation of the conflict. The tactics of terror in the name of Allah therefore has been a careful manipulation of popular will, in addition to a conviction in the writings of Wahabbi thinkers such as Qutb. The effect of the nationalism that encompassed the Iranian Revolution, together with the philosophies of al-Banna and Qutb thus gave rise to a potent mix of nationalism and religion in the form of Hamas. The product was a violent social and cultural revolution among Arabs in the Occupied Territories. Any moderation of Hamas enforced by popular will however would have a telling effect on such Wahabbi thinking in practice, as Hamas appears to gradually but surely shift away from its founding principles as stipulated in its Charter.

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[1] Debra D. Zedalis. “Female Suicide Bombers,” Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.

[2] Ziad Abu-Amir. “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background,” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 22, no. 4, (Summer, 1993). p6.

[3] Abu-Amr, 1993. p9.

[4] Hala Mustafa. “al-Jihad al-Islami fi al-ard al-muhtalla” (The Islamic Jihad in the Occupied Territories), Qadaya Fihriyya, no. 6, (April, 1987):179, quoted in Abu-Amr, 1993:9.

[5] Abu-Amr, 1993. p9.

[6] Ibid., p9.

[7] Mithaq harakat al-muqawama al-islamiyyah – Filastin (Hamas) (n.p., 1409h/1988), [hereafter the Hamas Charter], Article 1-2.

[8] Ibid., Article 2.

[9] Ibid., Article 4.

[10] Kerry Noble. “Tabernacle of Hate: Why They Bombed Oklahoma City,” (Prescot, Ontario: Voyageur, 1998). p206., quoted in Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 3rd ed., (Berkeley : University of California Press, 2003). p149.

[11] Juergensmeyer, 2003. p149.

[12] Ibid., p156.

[13] Quoted in Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita M. Deny. “The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring 2003). p179.

[14] Helga Baumgarten. “The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism: 1948-2005,” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. xxxiv, no. 4, (Summer, 2005). pp27-36.

[15] First Communiqué of Hamas. In Khaled Hroub. Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, (Washington DC : Institute for Peace Studies, 2000). p265.

[16] Bernard Lewis. “The Return of Islam,” Middle East Reader, (New Brunswick, NJ : Transaction Books, 1986). p69.

[17] Thomas J. Butko. “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 31, no. 1, (May, 2004). pp41-42.

[18] Ibid., p42.

[19] “Hamas Charter,” 1988. Article 9.

[20] Ibid., Article 15.

[21] Ibid., Article 16.

[22] Interview with Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi. Khan Yunis, Gaza, March 1, 1998, quoted in Juergensmeyer, 2003. p168.

[23] Ehud Sprinzak. “The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 3, no. 1, (Spring, 1991). p59.

[24] “Hamas Charter,” 1988. Article 22.

[25] Meir Litvak. “The Islamisation of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 34, no. 1, (January 1988). pp148(16), [6].

[26] “Hamas Charter,” 1988. Article 9.

[27] Hassan al-Banna. Quoted in Livtak, 1998. p[3].

[28] Mark Schaller and A.M.D.N. Abeysinghe. “Geographical Frame of Reference and Dangerous Intergroup Attitudes: A Double Minority Study in Sri Lanka,” Political Psychology, vol. 27, no. 4, 2006. p616.

[29] Khurshid Ahmad. “The Nature of Islamic Resurgence,” in John L. Espotiso (ed), “Voices of Resurgent Islam,” (New York : Oxford University Press, 1983). p222.

[30] Ibid., p223.

[31] Hamas Charter, 1988. Article 16.

[32] International Herald Tribune, May 6, 2001, cited in Osman Bakar, “Islam and Political Legitimacy in Malaysia,” Routledge Curzon, 2003. p134.

[33] Ahmad, 1983. p223.

[34] United Nations Security Council. accessed. 19.10.06.

[35] T. David Mason. “Structures of Ethnic Conflict: Revolution versus Secession in Rwanda and Sri Lanka,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 15, no. 4, (Winter, 2003). p85.

[36] Ibid., Article 17.

[37] Ibid., Article 2.

[38] Livtak, 1998. p[3].

[39] Ibid., p[5].

[40] Hroub, 2000. p44.

[41] “Hamas Charter,” 1998. Article 28.

[42] Ibid., Article 24.

[43] Benjamin Barber. “Constitutional Faith,” in Joshua Cohen, (ed). “For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Pluralism,” (Boston : Beacon Press, 1996). pp30-37, quoted in Amal Jamal. “The Ambiguities of Minority Patriotism: Love for Homeland Versus State Among Palestinian Citizens of Israel,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol. 10, no. 3, (Autumn, 2004). p435.

[44] Charles Taylor. “Why Democracy Needs Patriotism,” in Cohen, 1996, quoted in Jamal, 2004. p434.

[45] “Hamas Charter,” 1988. Article 15.

[46] Ibid., Article 10.

[47] Henry Munson. “Islam, Nationalism and Resentment of Foreign Domination,” Middle East Policy, vol. 10, no. 2, (Summer, 2003). p40.

[48] Ayatollah Khomeini. Quoted in Munson. 2003. p42.

[49] Litvak, 1998. p[2].

[50] “Hamas and Us,” from the Editors, New Republic, March 6, 2006. np.

[51] Bauwmgarten, 2005. p40.

[52] Ibid., p40.

[53] Ibid., p32.

[54] Ibid., p43.

[55] “Hamas Charter,” 1988. Article 14.

[56] Ibid., Article 14.

[57] Ibid., Article 28.

[58] Ibid., Article 32.

[59] Ibid., Article 28.

[60] Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman. “The Psychology of Terrorism: ‘Syndrome’ Versus ‘Tool’ Perspectives,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 18, no. 2, (Summer. 2006). p194.

[61] Post et. al., 2003. p179.

[62] Ibid., p179.

[63] Ami Pedahzur. “Towards an Analytical Model of Suicide Terrorism – A Comment,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 4 (Winter, 2004). p842.

[64] “Hamas Charter,” 1988. Article 13.

[65] Ibid., Article 13.

[66] D. della Porta. “Political Socialisation in Left Wing Underground Organisations: Biographies of Italian and German Militants,” In D. della Porta (Ed.), Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organisations, (Greenwhich, CT : JAI Press, 1992). pp259-290; D. della Porta. “Left Wing Terrorism in Italy,” In M. Crenshaw (Ed.), Terrorism in Context, (University Park, PA : Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995a). pp105-159; D. della Porta. Social Movements and Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995b), cited in Martha Crenshaw. “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21^st Century,” Political Psychology, vol. 21, no. 2, 2000. p409.

[67] Cialdini et. all., “Basking in Reflected Glory: Three (Football) Field Studies,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 34, 1976, quoted in. Sophia Moskalenko, Clark McCauley and Paul Rosin, “Group Identification Under Conditions of Threat: College Students’ Attachment to Country, Family, Ethnicity, Religion and University Before and After September 11, 2001,” Political Psychology, vol. 37, no. 1, 2006. p79.

[68] Quoted in. Post et. all., 2003. pp175-176.

[69] Rogers Brubaker. “Ethnicity without Groups,” Archives, Européenes de Sociologie, vol. 43, 2002, pp163-189; Rogers Brubaker. Mara Loveman and Peter Stamatov. “Ethnicity as Cognition,” Theory and Society, vol. 33, no. 1, 2004. pp.1-34; Rogers Brubaker. “Beyond Identity,” Theory and Society, vol. 29, no. 1, 2000. pp1-47, cited in Richard Jenkins. “When Politics and Social Theory Converge: Group Identification and Group Rights in Northern Ireland,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol. 12, 2006. pp190-191.

[70] Robert Pape. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (Carlton North, Vic : Scribe Publications, 2005), cited in Natalie O’Brien. “Psyche of a Terrorist,” The Australian, Thursday, August 24, 2006.

[71] E.J. Hobsbawm. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990). p10, quoted in Umut Ozkirimli. Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, (Palgrave : New York, NY, 2000). p86.

[72] P. James. Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community, (London : Sage, 1996). pp105-107, cited in Ozkirimli, 2000. p87.

[73] Ozkirimli, 2000. pp86-87.

[74] Andrew Silke. “Cheshire-Cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research,” Psychology, Crime and Law, vol. 4, 1998. quoted in Crenshaw, 2000. p407.

[75] Kruglanski and Fishman, 2006. p194.

[76] Silke, 1998. pp51-52.

[77] Ibid., pp51-52.

[78] Sprinzak, 1991. p64.

[79] Hamas Charter, Article 13.

[80] “Hamas, Fatah Agree to End Internal Violence,” Aljazeera.com: Al Jazeera Magazine, October 20, 2006. accessed 30.10.06.

[81] Ibid., np.

[82] MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. accessed 30.10.06.

[83] Mahmud Zahar. Quoted in Baumgarten, 2005. p41.

Hizbullah: Objectives & Islamist Intentions

UN Security Council Resolution 1701 has brought about an uncertain peace to Lebanon and Israel. In the scholarly circles of international relations and the media alike however, the debate is ongoing. While Hizbullah has since been described as ‘not a militia but an infantry brigade with all the support units,’ its motives and those of its leader Hassan Nasrallah have been topics of contemporary discussion.[1] This essay will explore the objectives behind Hizbullah’s existence and the nature of its Islamist ideals, as it attempts to examine the motivations of the party as an Islamist organisation. In light of the latest conflict, this paper will also examine motivations for the war as well as Hizbullah’s position in the aftermath.

The Party of God

Hizbullah was set up in 1982 (formally chartered in 1985) in response to what was perceived as a weak stance taken by Amal against the Phalange and occupying Israeli forces. Thus, sponsored by the Shiite leadership in Tehran, Hizbullah (Hizb Allah – Party of God) was founded and its cadres were trained by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp stationed in Lebanon. The new Shiite party fulfilled not only post-revolution Shiite religious interests in Lebanon but also the role of guarantor of a regional balance of power to fulfil Tehran’s geo-political interests vis-à-vis Israel. Indeed, as Alex Vantaka comments, “the relationship is far less about Shiite Islamist designs than it is about realpolitik, as Hizbullah is Iran’s main deterrence against Tel Aviv…… Iran’s, not Islamist interests come first.”[2] For Hizbullah’s own part however, the raison d’etre behind its establishment was resistance to the occupying Israeli forces (who occupied Lebanon from 1982 to 2000, having previously invaded Lebanon in 1978). In solidarity with the Palestinian cause, the party refuses to recognise the existence of the State of Israel and has pledged to work towards its complete annihilation and the liberation of Jerusalem.[3] Thus was its main opposition to the political posture of coexistence taken by Amal. The latter’s policy on disarmament of militias no doubt directly impacted the former, while also being of direct benefit to Tel Aviv. This, together with the formation of the National Salvation Committee by the Phalange and Amal – seen by the more radical as selling out on the interests of the Shiites - undoubtedly led to the rationale behind the establishment of Hizbullah as a counter-force within Lebanon’s Shiite community.[4]

Hizbullah: An Ideological Perspective

Hizbullah is a political realist organisation with an undeniable Islamist ideology. The party has a stated intention of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon.[5] In opposing the Zionist enemy, the party stands in solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Hizbullah has also stated its vehement opposition to western and eastern imperial interests alike, citing both western capitalist and eastern socialist states as entities obsessed with their own power.[6] It has resolved to purge Lebanon of such imperialist interests, including those of ‘America, France and their allies.’[7] In an Open Letter to the people of Lebanon and the world in 1985, the party quoted Khomeini as repeatedly stressing the evils of America as “the source of all malice” and argued that by fighting America, they are only exercising a legitimate right to defeat Islam and their nation.[8]

Radicalisation of the Shiites

It is of interest to examine contributory factors that led to the radicalisation of Lebanon’s Shiites. Undoubtedly, the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the Shebba Farms contributed in no small measure, as did their denial of statehood to the Palestinian people. Thus, the borders assumed post 1967 (Six Day War) were instrumental as a catalyst to this radicalisation. However being a majority in Lebanon, the Shiites remained politically marginalised by the Maronite Christians, who virtually monopolised political power. Thus Shiite radicalisation in Lebanon can perhaps be traced to the late 1960s.[9] The Taif Accord (1989) introduced a confessional political system in which the Presidency would rest with the Maronites, a position which unlike all others in the Assembly was not accountable to the legislative or to the people. Although having eventually acceded to it at the time of signing, Hizbullah opposes the Taif Accord in principle and has called for the abolition of sectarian politics from the Lebanese political arena. [10] It has since stated its objective of abolishing the confessional political system and taking the Phalange to task for what it terms “crimes committed against both Muslims and Christians with the encouragement of America and Israel.”[11] Clearly, its pseudo-consent to the Accord was in keeping with the political pressures within a deeply fragmented polity.

The Changing Face of Hizbullah

There is little doubt that Hizbullah has evolved with time in response to the realpolitik of the day. Having once chosen the revolutionary path as the only means of fulfilling its goals, the entrance of Hizbullah into the political mainstream when it contested parliamentary elections in 1992 was a watershed in the self-adjusting nature of the organisation. Indeed, it is now very much the thermostat as opposed to the thermometer of Lebanese politics. Hizbullah’s refraining from conducting military operations inside Israel and its more moderate statements calculated to appeal to the diverse religious make-up of the Lebanese electorate is evidence of the outwardly moderated stance of Hizbullah towards a more participatory and realist approach in the immediate aftermath of its entrance into mainstream democratic politics.[12] In April 1996, it even went as far as to sit at the same table with the Americans, the French and the Israelis, among others, as part of the South Lebanon Monitoring Group, in the aftermath of another Israeli invasion.[13] Interestingly however, while Hizbullah has moderated for its Lebanese electorate, its bellicose rhetoric persisted with regard to regional issues. For instance, the Deputy Head of Hizbullah Sheikh Naim Qassem has been quoted as saying that “any American or Israeli attack against the peaceful Iranian nuclear facilities will be a huge mistake and will lead to huge reactions.”[14]

The party subscribes to Shiite Islam as espoused by Ayatollah Khomeini during the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) and has referred to the former as “the leader.”[15] It believes in governance through Waliyat al Fiqih (religious jurist). Although having believed in the Quranic principle of ash-Shura (consultation), in accordance with the Shiite theory that the establishment of an Islamic order is impossible as long as the Twelfth Imam remains in occultation, Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (often considered the spiritual leader of Hizbullah) has since remarked that the Iranian revolution convinced him of the efficacy of Waliyat al Fiqih as a foundation of government within the setting of an Islamic State in Lebanon.[16] Unlike other Islamist organisations such as al-Qaeda, Jemmah Islamiyyah and Hamas however, Hizbullah does not uphold the notion of kafir (apostate). Thus whereas in accordance with the brand of Islam practiced by the former where collaboration with non-believers is forbidden and is punishable by death, Hizbullah’s collaboration with non Shiites and indeed with non-Muslims is strongly indicative of its political realism, in response to the necessities of the deeply fragmented Lebanese polity. Indeed, nomination of the Sunni Muslim Ibrahim Bayan for the post of Prime Minister to be in contention against Hariri is testimony to the fact. As Nizar Hamzeh comments, “the party has concentrated more on the ballot box than on bullets and military victories.”[17] In light of Hizballah’s non-compliance with UN Resolution 1559 and in all probability with the latest Security Council Resolution 1701, one may argue that bullets and military victories have not altogether been abandoned. While this holds true, the claim that Hizbullah has publicly moderated since its inception in accordance with the dictates of Lebanon’s realpolitik maybe further demonstrated through its continued participation in democratic parliamentary elections – it presently holds two Cabinet portfolios. The party machinery was in full throttle as it prepared for its maiden democratic elections in 1992, back then, evidence of a political party in the making.

Indeed, Hizbullah’s resistance posture towards Israel and the west is moderated on its own turf in the name of Islam. According to Husayn al-Mussawi’s interpretation of the Shari’a, ‘an oppressive government is preferable to chaos, because chaos is even more oppressive.’[18]

Presently, the party has both an effective political wing and a robust military structure. Hizbullah consists of a combat structure as well as a separate security one. The former consists of al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance) and al-Jihad al-Ismali (Islamic Holy War). Suicide missions against Western and Israeli targets are conducted by the former, who’re only called upon in the event of a mission; they otherwise integrate with the civilian population, making them doubly difficult to locate in the event of an enemy attack on the unit. The second unit leads more conventional attacks against the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in South Lebanon.[19] Hizbullah also has an effective intelligence body, the efficacy of which was proved during the most recent conflict, in locating and ear-marking Israeli strategic positions for missile targeting. It is of interest to note the condemnation by Nasrallah of the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11, 2001 but not on the Pentagon, where the taking of civilian lives was vilified by him in the American context but praised in the Israeli context.[20]

The Lebanon War

Back to the ashes and simmering tensions. It has been widely argued that Hizbullah was a pawn in a proxy war between Tehran and Washington. It is timely indeed that Tehran and Damascus should have entered into a Defence Cooperation Agreement in June 2006, just days before Hizbullah’s incursion into Israeli territory on July 12, in the killings and kidnappings that were the catalysts to this war. There is widespread knowledge in intelligence circles that Hizbullah is sponsored by both Tehran and Syria, with the former equipping the Lebanese group with Katyusha, Fidjr-3, Fidjr-5 and even Zelzal-2 missiles, the latter capable of carrying a warhead of 600 kilograms over a range of up to 200 kilometres - capable of reaching Tel Aviv, home to two million people.[21] While it served Syria’s interests for Hizbullah to use this artillery against Tel Aviv in a bid to coerce the return of the Golan Heights, Ahmadinejad may well have appreciated the international distraction caused, perhaps even calculated to divert hawks away from Tehran’s uranium enrichment programme - widely criticised by Washington - ahead of the August 28 ‘quit’ deadline set by the UN Security Council. In retrospect, it has now been revealed that Iran has unveiled the Arak heavy water reactor project capable of producing plutonium by-product.[22] It is an interesting coincidence that Tehran successfully launched a Sagheb long range radar-evading missile, described by analysts as an Air Defence Missile.[23] Thus this writer presents the hypothesis that this was a proxy war engineered by Tehran so as to divert attention from its enrichment programme. For Israel’s own part, Ehud Olmert may have wished to prove his worth.[24] Nasrallah for his role had all the artillery he could possibly have wished for. While the IDF withdrew unilaterally the last time sans any conditions, in the latest conflict, it failed to secure either of its stated war aims – the killing of Nasrallah or the obliteration of Hizbullah. Nasrallah said that victory would consist of merely surviving. Indeed as the Economist reports, Hizbullah were not only standing, it also fired 246 rockets into Israel on the last day of combat.[25] Thus once again, Hizbullah has emerged the victor. Its courage to stand up to the might of the Zionist forces and to emerge ‘all guns blazing’ has sans much doubt, positively affected its popularity ratings, not only among the Shiites but also among other Muslims in Lebanon. Each of these adults has a vote. Thus whatever the conditions that led to war – proxy war or not – Hizbullah seems to have benefited in its electorate. Further still, the relationship between Hizbullah and Israel could perhaps be described as bitter-sweet. It is the existence of the ‘Zionist enemy’ that has stood to gain Hizbullah the most political mileage. Sans Israel, the Party of God would be ‘rebels without a cause.’ As Zisser observes, “it was the struggle with Israel that had effectively prevented the organisation from sinking into the Lebanese political quagmire and becoming just one of many political parties operating in Lebanon.”[26]

Nasrallah’s latest claims that he did not want war and that he would not have ordered the kidnappings had he anticipated such may well be aimed at appeasing those Lebanese voters who blame Hizbullah for antagonising Israel.[27] Galvanising a Shiite vote-base alone will never be enough for Hizbullah. If it succeeds in convincing the wider Muslim electorate that in comparison with Siniora’s government and the Lebanese army, Hizbullah is indeed the more powerful and capable, its chances of seizing power so as to undo the confessionalist system may carry hope. On the contrary however, if it fails to assure its electorate of its role as ‘protectors’ as opposed to ‘antagonists,’ any hopes of reversing the Taif Accord will be destined to fail. Thus the objective of an Islamic State would remain unfulfilled.

---

[1] Yossi Kuperwasser. Quoted in. Ed. Blanche. “Hizbullah ATGMs Take Heavy Toll in Lebanon,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, (posted) August 17, 2006.

[2] Alex Vantaka. “Arab-Iranian Relations,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (posted) August 21, 2006.

[3] “Open Letter by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World.,” February 16, 1985, in Angustus Richard Norton, Amal and Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, Austin, Texas, University of Texas Press, 1987. p173.

[4] Asad AbuKhalil. “Ideology and Practice of Hizbullah in Lebanon: Islamisation of Leninist Organisational Principles,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1991. p391.

[5] Ibid., p173.

[6] Ibid., p178.

[7] “Open Letter by Hizb Allah.,” in Norton, 1987. p173.

[8] Ibid., p170.

[9] AbuKhalil, 1991. p391.

[10] “Open Letter by Hizb Allah.,” February 16, 1985, in Angustus Richard Norton, Amal and Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, Austin, Texas, University of Texas Press, 1987. p173.

p177.

[11] Ibid., p173.

[12] “Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crisis: A Middle East Programme Report,” ‘Lebanon,’ Ed. Lowe, Robert & Spencer, Clair. Chatham House, (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 2006. p26.

[13] Ibid., p26.

[14] Naim Qassem, quoted in. Ibid., p27.

[15] Ibid., 170.

[16] Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. Quoted in. AbuKhalil, 1991. p391.

[17] A. Nizar Hamzeh. “Lebanon’s Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1993. p321.

[18] Husayn al-Mussawi. Quoted in. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb. “Hizbullah: Politics and Religion,” London, Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2002. p23.

[19] Hamzeh, 1993. p328.

[20]

[21] “Hizbullah’s Blitz: A New Kind of War,” Tactical, Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, (posted) August 10, 2006.

[22] “Iran Launches New Nuclear Project,” Al Jazeera, Saturday, August 26, 2006. (accessed 28.08.06).

[23] Iran Tests Long Range Missile,” Al Jazeera, Sunday, August 27, 2006. (accessed 28.08.06).

[24] “The Accidental War,” Leaders, The Economist, London, July 22-28, 2006. p13.

[25] “Nasrallah Wins the War,” Leaders, The Economist, London, August 19-25, 2006. p9.

[26] Eyal Zisser. “Hizbullah: Between Armed Struggle and Domestic Politics” in Revolutionaries and Reformers, ed. Barry Rubins, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 2003. p96.

[27] “Nasrallah Says He Did Not Want War,” Al Jazeera, Monday, August 28, 2006. . (accessed 28.08.06).

Fighting an Unknown Enemy: Global War on Terror

“If you know the enemy yourself,” Sun Tzu famously advised centuries ago, “you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.” The immediate reaction of the United States to the attacks of September 11, 2001 was the declaration of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) that proposed to eradicate the world of the menace of terrorism and its sponsors. It remains significant however that despite the lapse of nearly six years since the attacks, the identification of the threat seems apparently vague. While the enemy has been defined as Al Qaeda, no further distinction has been made. Significantly, terrorism remains a powerful reality. Indeed the bombings in Bali (2002 and 2005), Riyadh (May and November 2003, April 2004), Madrid (2004) and London (2005) demonstrate with little doubt that despite claims to the contrary, the threat of terrorism remains at large. In fact, al Qaeda propagandists have claimed that they now possess the capability to carry out two major attacks in a year as opposed to one every two years prior to September 11, 2001. If one were to consider the bombings in Riyadh in 2003 in which 51 people were killed, such a claim does hold true. Hence, the GWOT could thus far not only be deemed to have failed in its objectives but also have positively contributed to the spawning of further radicalisation and terrorism. This post will argue that the strategy of the United States in the GWOT has been deeply flawed on several counts. It will argue that the failure to accurately identify and assess the enemy as well as poor diplomacy and near-sightedness has led to further radicalisation of the Muslim world.

Analysts such as Hoffman and Burke have argued that the GWOT has been beset by strategies and thinking based on an anachronistic Cold War bi-polar World Order. Such a line of argument is evidenced in the repeated emphasis by George W. Bush on the need to reprimand states sponsoring terrorism. The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq provide testimony to this focus on rogue states and state sponsors. Such reductionist thinking has failed to address the modernist terrorism of transnational dimensions. Rauffer has argued that while transnational terrorism was once waged by groups organised or sponsored by states and their intelligence establishments where actors mechanistically obeyed orders and fulfilled the agenda of the state, the demise of the bi-polar world order has led to a biological nature of terrorism. In such a respect, terrorism is carried out by autonomous groups and private sponsors such as Osama bin Laden. However there seems a consistent failure to acknowledge this shift in paradigms by the US government, resulting in the waging of a continued ‘war’ against an unknown enemy.

It maybe argued that the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq were counter-productive to the Coalition forces in that it gave further credibility to the claims of bin Laden that Western imperialists were invading Muslim lands (bin Laden’s fatwa, 1998). Claims by al Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Abu Gheith, that Islamist militants reserve the right to kill four million Westerners, including two million children, in order to avenge deaths of an equal number of fellow Muslims, have given rise to what has been termed a ‘balance of terror.’ Indeed such reasoning makes obvious the assessment that what has now been unleashed is not a successful counter-terrorism operation but a vicious cycle of violence. The invasions and resultant offensives have provided fodder for propagandist video footage used by al Qaeda to promote the argument that Western imperialists were claiming the lives of more Muslims, thereby contributing to heightened religious nationalism among them. While some analysts have dated the origins of this nationalism to the 1967 war, Islamists such as bin Laden adopt the primordialist approach, thus dating the origins of their grievances back to the time of the Prophet (Muslim year one) and the battles waged by Salah-din. Indeed the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent Balfour Declaration, have also been cited. Such arguments lend credibility to theories of Western conquests of Muslim lands, as often echoed to the ummah by bin Laden.

The rhetoric of President Bush has contributed further to such thinking. Linguists have expressed concern that the use of terms such as ‘crusade’ and ‘war,’ ‘light and dark,’ ‘good and evil’ as well as ‘civilisation and barbarianism’ contribute towards dichotomising the conflict between Islam and the West. Such reductionist rhetoric of the President has lent credibility to claims by Islamist radicals such as bin Laden, of a conflict between ‘them’ and ‘us,’ and could well support a much contested thesis of a clash of civilisations prophesied by Huntington, supported by Lewis. Religious rhetoric such as ‘crusade’ has also helped galvanise the support of America’s vast religious right, indeed many of whom had elected the President to office.

The dichotomy between ‘them’ and ‘us’ that has been brought about by the GWOT and its reductionist religious rhetoric has witnessed a revival of Western nationalism based on a fear-psychosis of an unseen enemy. This has resulted in stereo-typing and ethnic profiling, thus contributing to structural and cultural violence, not just towards Muslims in distant lands but also closer to home, indeed in the West itself. Feelings of isolation have increased among Western-based Muslims, due to such profiling. Present day debates on the wearing of the hijab and the niqab testify to this claim. Such feelings of cultural isolation have led to social exclusion and marginalisation of a further demographic. The propensity for vengeance of such groups has been chillingly demonstrated by the cases of home-grown terrorists such as London bombers Mohammed Sidiq Khan and Shezad Tanweer, while Australia has its own case in Fareeh Khalid Lodhi. The cases of these men have produced a frightening revelation that terrorists can also be nurtured in Western liberal democracies. This line of truth could well serve to dismiss the anachronistic assumption of the involvement of rogue states and sponsor regimes in modern terrorism.

Alliances that have been forged by the United States with the Arab world remain poorly shaped. Indeed former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright suggested that Bush’s call on Arab nations to rally in support of an invasion on a fellow Muslim nation for its oil reserve and to also support a doctrine of pre-emption as part of a single package is a miscalculation of acute proportions. Such near-sighted reasoning has undoubtedly contributed to the radicalisation of the Muslim populations within these same Arab nations, whose authoritarian regimes were lobbied in support of the GWOT by the United States.

The 2004 prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib had a significantly negative impact on the United States, especially in the Islamic world. The humiliation suffered during torture at the detention centre, widely publicised by the media almost certainly negatively impacted the pride of Muslims across the world. Indeed the scandal neutralised the previously oft used argument of human rights violations at the torture chambers of Iraq in the Saddam Hussain era.

In 1979, Afghanistan served as a training ground for terrorists. Indeed present day veterans such as bin Laden, Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali were all products of the 1979 mujahideen. The period of Soviet occupation provided a training ground for Islamic militants. The assassination of Northern Alliance Commander Masood two days prior to the September 11 attacks indicates that bin Laden expected the attack on Afghanistan and wished to neutralise the threat from any Northern Alliance and Western frontier against them. Thus since the beginning of the invasion, it could be argued that the Afghan training ground of 1979 has been replicated in the form of both Afghanistan (2001 invasion) and present day Iraq. Some analysts have argued that the Iraq war provided cannon fodder for the war machine, in terms of amateur al Qaeda operatives, the rationale of the argument being that the senior operatives were readying for attacks elsewhere. Therefore the deaths of such operatives in Iraq would further al Qaeda propaganda of Western imperialists killing Muslims within Muslim lands. The high level of collateral damage by the Coalition forces has only further radicalised Muslims.

While it remains true that the phenomenon of transnational terrorism must be urgently dealt with, the anachronistic nature of US policy and the reductionist rhetoric of the President have only contributed to isolate large sections of the Muslim population, thus contributing to a significant increase in radicalisation. The Bush camp’s dichotomisation of the conflict as between ‘good and evil,’ and as a ‘crusade’ has increasingly polarised the world between Islam and the West. If such rhetoric and reductionism are not seriously checked and if more innovative soft-power approaches are not adopted instead of the overly militaristic approach best suited against state actors and monolithic terrorism of the past, the vicious cycle of violence that has now been unleashed may continue. As Hoffman has suggested, strategies involving closer transnational intelligence co-operation and sharing, in addition to a social science-based approach involving political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists and linguists should be seriously considered. What the world faces today is a new form of terrorism. Clearly, any efficient combating of this threat will require an inter-disciplinary, innovative approach of strategic diplomacy and counter-terrorism initiatives.

China Threat: Fact or Fiction?

Several factors contribute to the much hyped thesis of the ‘China threat.’ Rapid economic expansion, increased defence expenditure, heightened nationalism at home and a continued hard-line stance against Taiwanese cessation are perhaps high on the list. The events in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96 that led to the conducting of PRC missile tests off the coast of Taiwan and the deployment of two US Carrier Battle Groups (CBG) in the Strait were perhaps best described from China’s viewpoint through the title of a 1996 nationalist publication titled ‘The China That Can Say No.’ The missile tests and belligerent CCP approach towards the United States vis-à-vis its Taiwan policy was no doubt, a reflection of popular sentiment on the mainland. The 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade meanwhile, was yet another event that fuelled Chinese nationalism.

Debate on whether or not there is a legitimate threat of China acting as a global hegemon must be based on two main considerations. The first is present capabilities and the second is power projection over time. Since 2000, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been expanding rapidly. The number of new surface combatants and submarines that have entered service between 2000 and 2004 has more than doubled in comparison to the entire decade of the 1990s. The first of two Sovremenny class guided missile destroyers were purchased for the PLAN from Russia in 2000. According to an independent UK-based website ‘Chinese Defence Today,’ four such class destroyers are among eleven destroyers in the PLAN fleet. The same source states that the PLAN has four Type 091 Han class nuclear powered attack submarines and one Type 092 class Xia nuclear powered missile submarine. However according to a 2006 monograph by University of New South Wales academic You Ji, “the production of the new class conventional submarines has been slow in coming. The replacement of 091 nuclear attack submarines has also been delayed over and over. With only one crippled nuclear-powered strategic missile submarine in service, China’s nuclear triad capability exists only in theory.” According to the same analyst, the PLAN’s fleet has only two sonar-enabled vessels. This would severely impair it when up against high quality nuclear submarines such as the United States’ USS Nebraska. Claims that outdated Russian weapons technology purchased by the Chinese is incompatible with the latest platforms that are being researched and developed domestically have also been made. Meanwhile, intensive Research and Development (R&D) for the PLAN is being conducted. Analysts have claimed that the PRC has several nuclear launching sites, concealed with the aid of a large number of fake sites, to counter satellite detection. However, at present, power projection of the PLAN remains limited. Although the last five decades have seen a gradual evolution of strategic thinking since the founding of the PLAN in 1955, the realisation of its vision to evolve from jinan (in-shore) to jinhai (off-shore) has been observed by analysts such as You to be five years behind. However, China’s present economic growth rate of between 8-9 percent, if sustained, would generate ample funding for the PRC to embark on an accelerated development of its maritime force. Indeed it has long been realised by China that its strategic interests lie in its maritime environment. A doctrinal change by Admiral Liu in the 1980s from jinan to jinhai set up a kind of layered maritime defence. There has been some debate as to the interpretation of jinhai, with some researchers interpreting it as ‘green water,’ located between the coastal ‘brown water,’ and the deep ‘blue water,’ while others have chosen the interpretation to mean ‘blue water.’ The definition of ‘blue water’ in Chinese doctrinal terms has been seen by some analysts to mean waters just beyond the first island chain. Indeed China’s interests in the waters between the South China Sea and the East China Sea such as the disputed Spratley Islands as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan would be high on the PRC’s priorities that it would wish to safeguard. However, if the PRC is to pose any realistic threat to the sole global superpower the United States, the former would need to acquire maritime based facilities for Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) as well as superior firepower. The events in the Taiwan Strait may have demonstrated that China is prepared to risk a military confrontation with the United States over Taiwan but like the Gulf War, the issue also demonstrated the superior American power projection capabilities beyond reasonable doubt.

The events of the Taiwan Strait have been witnessed by analysts such as Aaron L. Friedberg as the result of a diplomatic miscalculation by the then newly sworn in Chinese President Jiang Zemin, who Friedberg has argued, had little experience in international affairs at the time. However, it has also been argued that the PRC achieved its aim of positively influencing the Taiwan policy of the United States. Notably, while for a limited period, the CCP permitted large scale protests and indeed, limited violence by the Chinese public in the aftermath of the Belgrade embassy bombing, the official line was one of caution. In June that same year, China refrained from exercising its Security Council veto to block a UN peace settlement for Kosovo, sanctioning the deployment of a NATO peacekeeping force. President Jiang Zemin met Bill Clinton on the margins of the September APEC summit in New Zealand and mentioned the Kosovo bombing only once. Evidently, the PRC was concerned over the temporary suspension of dialogue over its entry into the WTO. In a sense, its cautious diplomacy was rewarded with WTO entry in December 2001.

While realist-pessimists would argue that a US-China conflict is inevitable, the PRC’s domestic considerations must be taken into account. With the demise of the old guard, the CCP leadership has certainly evolved. Indeed capitalist icons such as McDonalds and KFC symbolise the CCP’s embracing of market forces as realpolitik has dictated. Thus, the CCP can best be viewed today as markedly less ideological, but totalitarian in nature. Forces of dissent, although seldom willingly tolerated, have re-emerged since the Tiananmen Square massacre. Faloung Gong continues to have a wide following that some argue, even consists of some of the CCP membership. As has been described, nationalism reached a crescendo in the late 1990s. Amidst the protests against the Belgrade bombing, dissenters to the government were also heard. With lessons from Tiananmen Square to learn from, the CCP is well aware that unless social forces are internally satisfied, continued regime survival cannot be assured. Thus the PRC’s immediate concern for its population of 1.3 billion will be to sustain its current levels of positive economic growth and distribute the harvest among its rural masses. For this, its continued membership of the WTO and ongoing global trade will be vital. Indeed continued trade with the United States that contributes to the PRC’s budgetary surplus will also be high in importance. In the interest of commerce, Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the Asia Pacific and in Southeast Asia will remain vital to China. As such, its relations with ASEAN states are of importance. The Taiwan Strait confrontation and any US Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) would perhaps present credible deterrents to the PRC, if temporary, not to risk another confrontation in the Strait or in the waters of the Asia Pacific. As the PRC remains extremely apprehensive of any Japanese naval expansion, in that respect, the presence of US forces in the region would perhaps be welcomed by Beijing, albeit as the guarantor of Japanese security.

Nevertheless caution must be voiced at any excessive military build-up by either the US, China or Japan, as this would certainly contribute to a security dilemma in the region. For instance, the US’s National Missile Defence (NMD) and TMD programmes are in effect, a denial of the PRC’s deterrence capability vis-à-vis the United States, its number one rival and would thus lead to greater concentration on the part of the PRC’s long range, high power weaponry such as its Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and nuclear warheads. The scenario, if unchecked, could potentially lead to a dangerous arms race, leading to precarious levels of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) capabilities, indeed a counter-force and contradiction to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, the converse is also pertinent: for reasons previously described such as MAD, the nuclear capabilities of the United States and China may well serve as a deterrent to conflict. For China’s part, unless its assistance in weaponry or R&D to Iran, North Korea and Pakistan is publicly called off and unless greater transparency is ensured in its defence expenditure, the US will continue to be cautious. From the United States, China would expect a halt to all cooperation with Taiwan, especially on matters of defence and a renunciation of any efforts at TMD in or around Taiwan. In the case of the formerly mentioned scenario of assistance to nuclear states, the PRC would have a vested interest in maintaining its influence in the region through good relations with North Korea and in the oil rich Middle East through Iran, to maintain security for its considerable energy requirements, while its vested interest in assistance to Pakistan will be as a counter-weight to Indian Ocean rival power India. As for its defence expenditure, as long as China feels threatened, the Central Military Commission (CMC) may not be in a hurry to ensure greater transparency of its defence budgets. Not least for this reason, US assistance to Taiwan will continue for the foreseeable future, as a counter-weight to Chinese power. For these reasons, while the realpolitik that Beijing will have to reckon with at home may indicate that a conflict will not loom on the horizon in the near future, a definitive peace will be less than forthcoming for the foreseeable time ahead. As for a global hegemon, present capabilities dictate that China is far from it, although a desire to secure regional interests such as Taiwan, the disputed Spratley Islands, the security of Hong Kong and regional trade routes may hint at intent for regional hegemony. That being said, China’s participation in multilateral initiatives such as ASEAN plus three, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and indeed, in hosting talks with North Korea, signal Beijing’s willingness at regional cooperation, at best with benign intent. Thus as has been previously mentioned, its immediate concern will be to contend with changing social forces within its rapidly growing population. As such, sustaining present economic growth sans the hindrance of external conflict will top the CCP’s agenda.